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Animals abound in eighteenth-century fiction. Many, like Betsy Thoughtless’s pet 
squirrel, killed by her cruel husband, or Sophia Western’s bird, maliciously freed by 
Master Blifil, make brief appearances to point a human moral. Some, like Yorick’s 
trapped starling, prompt reflection on the human fates that parallel their own.
1
  
Sometimes they narrate the story themselves, like the lap-dog Pompey, who records 
his satirical observations of human society from the vantage-point of a pet passed 
from owner to owner.
2
 In the last two decades of the century, familiar domestic and 
work animals, and small wild animals and birds, featured increasingly as fictional 
protagonists. Dogs, cats, horses, robins, swallows, goldcrests, canaries, sparrows, 
squirrels, hares and mice became heroes and heroines. Dorothy Kilner’s Life and 
Perambulations of a Mouse (1783), in which a human narrator transmits the tale told 
her by the rodent, was followed by Sarah Trimmer’s immensely popular Fabulous 
Histories (1786), which focalises its narrative alternately through the robin family and 
the family of humans who feed them.
3
 In the 1790s and at the turn of the century, 
Edward Augustus Kendall specialised in fiction starring small birds, but his best-
known story was Keeper’s Travels, the adventures of a dog based on the author’s 
own.
4
 John Aikin and Anna Letitia Barbauld included a number of animal stories, 
such as ‘The Discontented Squirrel’, ‘The Young Mouse’, ‘The History and 
Adventures of a Cat’ and ‘The Little Dog. A fable’, in their 1790s collection Evenings 
at Home.
5
 A hare narrated an anonymous anti-hunting story of 1799, while the same 
year saw the first, serial publication of The Adventures of Dick, the little poney, a 
horse autobiography that in many respects anticipates Anna Sewell’s Black Beauty.6 
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The trend continued in the early years of the nineteenth century with further cat and 
dog autobiographies.
7
 
 
 Because this flowering of animal narrative took place within children’s fiction, 
these stories and others like them have generally been discussed within the context of 
the history of children’s and educational literature. Descended from Aesop’s fables, 
which were several times adapted for children in the eighteenth century, many of 
them attempted to teach moral lessons via metaphorical application of animals’ 
activities to human children. By no means all the lessons animals gave were taught 
through allegory. Children, perceived as less rational and closer to nature than adults, 
were thought to have a special affinity with animals. Animal stories were intended to 
educate children into their full humanity, both through natural history lessons teaching 
them animals’ and their own places in God’s creation, and through the anti-cruelty 
message that educational theorists from John Locke onwards agreed was crucial to the 
production of humane citizens.
8
 The stories have therefore been understood as 
performing the ideological work of early children’s writing, whether by politically 
progressive rationalists like Aikin and Barbauld or conservative Evangelicals like 
Trimmer, to further middle-class hegemony through spreading domestic ideology and 
values such as thrift, sobriety, and ‘charity, obedience, kindness to animals, and an 
appreciation of the natural world’.9 But the period’s stories about animals should not 
be seen only as a subset of children’s literature. They regularly drew on works of 
natural history that disseminated new observations of animals’ forms and habits and 
sometimes upheld, sometimes questioned, the line dividing ‘man’ from the beasts. 
They took their place alongside a growing literature of poems, sermons, essays and 
letters that, starting from the principle that non-human animals could feel as people 
 3 
did, advocated the compassionate treatment of creatures from elephants to insects.
10
 
An examination of these children’s animal narratives suggests that they played a role 
in the period’s re-thinking of animal—human relations. They entered the debate about 
animals’ mental capacities then being conducted in terms of animals as machines 
versus animals as sentient beings and instinct versus capacity for reason, and replayed 
in our own time by behaviourists and mentalists discussing the question of animal 
cognition.
11
 They took part in the incomplete but significant shift in animal 
representation from the fabular, the allegorical and the satirical to the naturalistic, the 
empathetic, and the inwardly focused. In particular, they pioneered narrative attempts 
to imagine the subjective experience of non-human animals. Drawing on the various 
techniques being developed by novelists from Henry Fielding and Samuel Richardson 
onwards to represent ‘fictional minds’,12 they applied them to the narrative creation of 
animal minds. 
 
 The stories’ descent from Aesop has encouraged an allegorical reading of 
these new animal fables. In the Aesopian tradition, animals stand for something else, 
usually some aspect of human behaviour, and their fables are the vehicle for moral 
warnings or political satire. The children’s stories often invite a metaphorical reading 
of their animal characters’ behaviour. Sarah Trimmer, who announces her Aesopian 
credentials in the title of her Fabulous Histories, and warns her readers that her 
anthropomorphic birds exist only in a fable ‘in which the sentiments and affections of 
a good Father and Mother, and a Family of Children, are supposed to be possessed by 
a Nest of Redbreasts; and others of the feathered race are, by the force of imagination, 
endued with the same qualities’, often uses her robins metaphorically.13 When the 
mother bird, wanting to share the task of providing for the nestlings, leaves their 
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father in charge of them while she hunts for food (he encourages her to go because the 
exercise will do her good, but fears he may prove an awkward nurse to the babies), he 
sings to entertain his children: 
 
Robin now remarked, that [the song] was very pretty indeed, and expressed his 
desire to learn it also. By all means, said his father, I shall sing it very often, so 
you may learn it if you please. For my part, said Flapsy, I do not think I could 
have patience to learn it, it will take so much time. – Nothing, my dear Flapsy, 
answered the father, can be acquired without patience, and I am sorry to find 
your’s [sic] begin to fail you already: But I hope, if you have no taste for 
music, that you will give the greater application to things that may be of more 
importance to you. Well, said Pecksy, I would apply to music with all my 
heart, but I do not believe it possible for me to attain it. Perhaps not, replied 
her father, but I do not doubt your application to whatever your mother 
requires of you, and she is an excellent judge both of your talents, and of what 
is suitable to your station in life. She is no songster herself, and yet she is very 
clever, I assure you.
14
 
 
The scene of instruction in the robin family parallels that in the story’s human family, 
the Bensons.  Trimmer recommends the virtues of patience and application, and 
reinforces gender roles by adapting natural historians’ observation of bird life (male 
birds do the singing) to imply an application to human culture (a girl should stick to 
the female tasks taught by her mother, who has her own talents and does not encroach 
on masculine ones). Another technique often used to point a moral in the animal 
stories is to make the animal protagonist the author’s surrogate, taking the satirical 
stance of the outsider whose naïve response to the behaviour he witnesses exposes its 
absurdity. The fiction of the animal viewpoint is used to create a satire centred on 
human concerns. Dick the pony muses on humanity’s odd attitude to time: 
 
my master, who had now grown a tall stripling, frequently exercised me 
himself, trying how fast I could go for a short distance, and then a longer one, 
pressing me with such vivacity, that I could not forbear fancying he was 
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training me to outstrip the winged inhabitants of the air. Every time I got to the 
end of the space in which he rode me, he pulled something very pretty out of 
his pocket, and, as far as I can judge, it told him how far I had gone in a 
certain time. I have heard this toy called a watch, and, as time is so valuable to 
mankind, they seem universally to wear it, and, no doubt, use it to warn them 
against the misapplication of the most precious of all things; yet, without any 
trouble or expense, the rising of the sun might tell them when to commence 
the duties of the day, and its setting, to retire to rest. For my own part, I 
wanted no other monitor; but the human race appear to be governed by other 
maxims, or to be inevitably subject to other laws; many of them never stir 
abroad till the splendid orb, that lights the earth, has reached the meridian, nor 
seek repose till the noon of night.
15
  
 
As in the example from Trimmer, the idea of animal nature is used primarily to 
comment on humanity: here the ‘natural’ wisdom of the horse, whose life follows 
circadian rhythms, is employed to satirize ‘unnatural’ human culture. 
 
However, not all uses of animal fable are metaphorical. As Frank Palmeri has 
shown, some of Aesop’s fables, and those of later imitators Jean de la Fontaine, Swift, 
and Gay, can be read as ‘auto-critical’: in these ‘anti-allegorical narratives’, animals 
stand for – and speak for -- themselves, and their complaints of human cruelty to 
beasts can be taken on a literal level.
16
 In the animal stories of late eighteenth-century 
children’s fiction, this tendency is taken further. When Dick the pony, relating the 
harsh treatment he receives from one rider, reports, ‘I was tempted to assert the rights 
of nature, and to retaliate the injuries I had received’, and warns that ‘[t]he most 
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stupid animal is not insensible to kindness, but revolts from oppression’; or when a 
persecuted hare, observing that the woman who tries to help him is beaten by her 
husband, reflects that ‘the same disposition that prompts a man to behave savagely 
towards his beast, will render him, whenever opportunity offers, a tyrant in his own 
family’; their message extends by implication into the politics of human social 
arrangements, but retains as primary its literal emphasis on human treatment of 
animals. The anti-cruelty message preached by the animal coincides with the moral of 
its fable.
17
 In addition, the project of teaching natural history through animal stories, 
while it certainly did not preclude moral meanings such as Trimmer’s ideas about 
proper gender roles being drawn from animal behaviour, was coloured by eighteenth-
century naturalists’ ‘new concern for grounding moral truths in nature’,18 and 
encouraged connections to be made between animals within the fiction and outside it, 
‘allowing issues of animal protection, conservation and what was later called ecology 
to be raised in a child-friendly manner’.19 Figurative and literal meanings were mixed 
together in the animal stories, and their authors were sometimes explicit about their 
dual purpose. Trimmer’s introduction to Fabulous Histories promises stories that 
provide ‘moral instruction applicable to [the children in her frame story, and by 
extension her child audience], at the same time that they excite compassion and 
tenderness for those interesting and delightful creatures, on which such wanton 
cruelties are frequently inflicted, and recommend universal Benevolence’.20 Edward 
Augustus Kendall explains that his fables have a ‘natural’ meaning, teaching the 
reader to understand animal behaviour and not to judge it by inappropriate human 
standards. The Canary Bird features discussions among birds and a beetle about the 
ethics of predation. The swallow considers beetles to be created only as its food; the 
beetle thinks the same of the tiny insects it eats; and a wagtail points out that a hawk 
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could offer the same reason for eating swallows. Part of the aim here is to satirize 
human pride, absurd as the swallow’s; but part, the narrator explains, is ‘to point out a 
natural, as well as a moral, truth. I wished to show you that a prejudice against 
particular creatures, for fancied acts of cruelty is absurd’.21 
 
 Learning natural history was believed to lead to greater imaginative sympathy 
with animals. Kendall, a keen student of natural history, distinguished between the 
fantastic and naturalistic elements of his animal fables in the introduction to The 
Swallow. ‘For the sake of miscellaneous instruction and entertainment’ he 
anthropomorphized his animals, giving them faculties, such as human speech, which 
they did not possess, and admittedly here ‘physical veracity is violated’; but it was on 
the more truthful parts of his representation that he claimed to depend for the reader’s 
emotional response: 
 
it is chiefly … by bringing animals forward in their real character, (a character 
possessed of certain portions of perception and memory, and the capacity of 
comparing ideas and acting in consequence) [,] by becoming a voice to the 
dumb, that the author hopes to promote their benefit … By presenting animals 
in this manner, a principal difficulty is obviated: that of leading the mind to 
remember that, beings of different species have, in part, the same views and 
interests: when this is once established, Nature which, till then, was not 
permitted to act, will assist  the moralist in claiming the sympathy of the heart: 
The scale to measure other’s wants by thine.22  
 
Kendall here looks to natural history to demonstrate the similarities between humans 
and other species: talking animals were a fiction but animals with some form of  
thinking powers were not. Later in the text he takes from Buffon’s work on birds the 
description of sparrows protecting their nests with a cover when building out in the 
open, and dispensing with the protection when building in a hole. He gives  Buffon’s 
comment as: “Instinct is manifested in this case in a manner nearly analogous to 
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reason, as it supposes, at least, the comparing together of two ideas.’ 23  He also uses 
William Smellie’s Philosophy of Natural History (1790) to argue that ‘though man is 
unquestionably the chief of the animal creation, the other animals, according to the 
mental powers with which nature has endowed them, comparatively approach to or 
recede from the sagacity and genius of the human species. The whole is a graduated 
scale of intelligence.’ 24  The anti-Cartesianism of the natural historians fed into the 
positive view of animals’ mental powers generally given in animal narratives. This 
appreciation of animals’ mental capacities is a quality shared with the earlier tradition 
of theriophily, in which Montaigne was  prominent. But where theriophilic writing 
tended to use the idea of animal wisdom and superiority as a satiric tool to expose 
human folly,  late eighteenth-century animal narratives were more serious in their 
suggestion that animals had a natural intelligence that made them, certainly not 
superior nor even equal to humans, but significantly like them.
25
 
 
The incorporation of naturalistic elements into the animal fable encouraged 
reader empathy with animal characters because the discourse of natural history 
suggested significant likenesses between human and animal; and recognised likeness 
between self and other was understood as the basis for the ‘sympathy of the heart’ 
praised by Kendall. The idea of sympathy developed in eighteenth-century science 
and philosophy, and especially in the work of David Hume and Adam Smith, strongly 
influenced the animal stories as it did other literature of the period. Sympathy was 
often understood as a physical communication of feeling. In 1711 Shaftesbury had 
described panic as a feeling spreading through a crowd, ‘rais’d in a Multitude, and 
convey’d by Aspect, or as it were by Contact or Sympathy’.26 In medical works, it 
denoted the internal communication between bodily organs. 
27
  The understanding of 
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sympathy as a physical process, belonging to corporeal or ‘animal’ nature, associated 
it with non-human animals.
28
 Hume, in particular, whose Treatise of Human Nature 
rooted emotions in somatic bases, as he ‘tried to reduce benevolence to something 
which was neither selfish nor unselfish, but rather physical’, often located sympathy 
among animals.
29
 In the Treatise he argues: 
 
’Tis evident, that sympathy, or the communication of passions, takes place 
among animals, no less than among men. Fear, anger, courage and other 
affections are frequently communicated from one animal to another, without 
their knowledge of that cause, which produc’d the original passion. Grief 
likewise is receiv’d by sympathy; and produces almost all the same 
consequences, and excites the same emotions as in our species. The howlings 
and lamentations of a dog produce a sensible concern in his fellows.
30
  
 
As well as sympathy between fellow dogs, Hume recognises sympathy between 
human and animal. In the Treatise he uses this idea to combat the notion of a 
universal benevolence or love of mankind:  
 
there is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as 
such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to ourself. 
‘Tis true, there is no human, and indeed no sensible, creature, whose happiness 
or misery does not, in some measure, affect us, when brought near to us, and 
represented in lively colours: But this proceeds merely from sympathy, and is 
no proof of such an universal affection to mankind, since this concern extends 
itself beyond our own species.
31
  
 
In this passage, cross-species sympathy comes in as it were by the back door. Hume 
wants to limit the notion of feeling: by saying it that it proceeds merely from 
sympathy, he defines it as a response mechanism, rather than an active virtue. But this 
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limitation in one direction becomes an extension in the other: such a response 
mechanism operates blindly in relation to all creatures that can feel. The writers of 
eighteenth-century animal narratives, then, are operating on a Humean principle: that 
an animal’s happiness or misery will ‘affect us, when brought near to us, and 
represented in lively colours’. 
 
Adam Smith, by contrast, who sees sympathy not as directly shared bodily 
sensation, but as a mental act that simulates such sharing, has little to say about non-
human animals. For him, sympathy is a matter between humans. Nevertheless his 
conception of sympathy is important for the development of a literature of cross-
species sympathy. Sympathy’s corporeal aspect is the basis for its strong association 
with animals in the first place: but the understanding of sympathy as an act of 
imaginative identification underpins the development of literary techniques to extend 
its boundaries across species. The literature of sensibility aimed to encourage in its 
readers that imaginative projection of the self into another’s sufferings that Smith saw 
as the indispensable condition for sympathy: 
 
Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, 
our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never 
can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we 
can form any conception of what are his sensations. … By the imagination we 
place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same 
torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the 
same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even 
feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike 
them.
32
 
 
As Markman Ellis has shown, the late eighteenth-century understanding of narrative 
art ‘reproduced the logic’ of Smith’s theory. In Clara Reeve’s formulation, the novel 
described things ‘such as may happen to our friend, or to ourselves’, and it should 
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temporarily persuade its readers ‘that all is real, until we are affected by the joys or 
distresses, of the persons in the story, as if they were our own’.33 In Tristram Shandy, 
Sterne aimed both to illustrate and invoke Smithian sympathy through a fictional 
example that echoes Smith’s own. Corporal Trim, asked to read aloud a sermon that 
invites us to imagine the experience of a hypothetical sufferer on the rack, breaks 
down because the words bring to mind the experience of his own brother, imprisoned 
by the Inquisition: ‘Oh! ‘tis my brother, cried poor Trim in a most passionate 
exclamation, dropping the sermon upon the Ground’.34 Late eighteenth-century 
animal stories extended the narrative evocation of Smithian sympathy across the 
species barrier. They repeatedly opposed cruelty by urging child readers to recognise 
that animals had feelings similar to their own, and to consider how they themselves 
would suffer under ill-treatment. Dorothy Kilner’s The Life and Perambulations of a 
Mouse is typical, with its condemnation of the little boy Charles for hanging a mouse 
up by its tail for the cat to jump at: ‘I beg you will consider’, says his father, ‘how you 
would like, that either myself, or some great giant, as much larger than you as you are 
bigger than the mouse, should hurt and torment you? And I promise you, the smallest 
creature can feel as acutely as you can’.35 Like Smith and Sterne, Kilner uses the idea 
of a brother’s pain to illustrate the process of sympathy. The mouse protagonist, 
Nimble, tells the human narrator the story of his life. In one episode, he witnesses the 
torture and death of his brother, Softdown. Softdown, caught in a trap in the nursery, 
is held up by the nurse to show to the baby, an act of cruelty depicted in one of the 
book’s illustrations (fig. 1). Nimble comments:  
 
What were the actions or sensations of poor Softdown at that dreadful moment 
I know not, but my own anguish, which it is impossible to describe, was 
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augmented every moment by seeing her shake the trap almost topsy-turvy, 
then blow through the trap at one end, at which times I saw the dear creature’s 
tail come out between the wires on the contrary sides, as he was striving, I 
suppose, to retreat from her. At length, after she had tortured him for some 
time, she set the trap on the table, so close to a large fire, that I am sure he 
must have been much incommoded by the heat…36   
 
The servant John comes in, takes Softdown by tail, and crushes him on hearth with his 
foot. Nimble comments: ‘My very blood runs cold within me at the recollection of 
seeing Softdown’s as it spirted from beneath the monster’s foot; whilst the craunch of 
his bones almost petrified me with horror’. At length, ‘with trembling feet, and a 
palpitating heart’ he returns, to tell his other brothers, whose anguish he can’t 
describe.
37
  As Smith’s theory would predict, Nimble does not ‘know’ Softdown’s 
sensations directly, but forms an idea of them through an imaginative projection of 
himself into his brother’s experience, a projection that his description in turn 
encourages the reader to share. It is through the narrator’s sympathetic identification 
with his brother’s feelings that the suffering of a mouse is made significant, while the 
child reader is encouraged through a similar act of imagination to respond both to 
Softdown and Nimble as if they were brothers, by extension of the concept of kin to 
the mouse.  
 
 Writers of animal narratives made it clear that children’s sympathy for animals 
was expected to lead to better treatment of them. Their subtitles were often explicit on 
this: Trimmer’s Fabulous Histories  was ‘Designed for the Instruction of Children, 
Respecting their Treatment of Animals’, while the anonymous Hare was  ‘Written as 
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a Stimulus to Youth Towards a Proper Treatment of Animals’. Kendall’s The 
Sparrow and Keeper’s Travels, and a compilation from Samuel Jackson Pratt entitled 
Pity’s Gift were advertised together in newspapers as being ‘intended to excite the 
compassion of youth to the animal creation’.38 Kilner gave her animal fable The 
Rational Brutes a verse epigraph: 
 
If tender sorrow melt thy youthful heart, 
Hear what BEASTS, BIRDS, and suff’ring FISH impart; 
Nor for thy transient sport, or lasting joy, 
The bliss of any thing that lives, annoy; 
But always recollect this wise decree, 
“Do, as thou wouldst it should be done to thee.”39 
 
Kendall concluded The Crested Wren with a plea from the goldcrest protagonist to the 
reader: ‘You, reader, if you have condescended to follow my pages regularly, have 
already “listened to my lore”. – May I hope that you will grant my other request? – 
Will you guard my golden head from harm? At least, will you refrain from harming it 
yourself, if we should happen to meet.’40 Evidently these writers, like many others of 
their time, theorized fiction through what is now called the ‘empathy-altruism’ 
hypothesis.
41
 The view that eighteenth-century narrative, with its concentration on 
encouraging the reader to identify with another’s sensations, was instrumental in the 
development of fundamental changes to social attitudes is expressed by the historian 
Lynn Hunt, who goes so far as to credit new mental habits induced by reading 
Richardson and Rousseau with paving the way for the concept of human rights.
42
 The 
children’s narratives of the late eighteenth century, encouraging their readers to 
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identify with animals’ feelings, were part of the changing climate of opinion that led 
to the beginnings of animal welfare legislation in the early years of the following 
century.
43
 
  
 Hunt’s optimistic reading of the social effects of sentimental writing is 
currently unfashionable among critics. An anti-sentimental attitude predominates, 
especially among postcolonial scholars, who indict the anti-slavery writing of this 
period for encouraging readers, safe in the comfort of their own superior subject-
position, to objectify the victims of slavery and indulge in the self-congratulatory 
pleasures of pitying them. The depiction of suffering others, they argue, becomes 
pornographic.
44
 The charge of self-indulgent emotionalism might be brought against 
some of the animal writing surveyed here. One of the stories in Pity’s Gift offers a 
classic example of the fault that critics from the eighteenth century onwards have 
found in the writing of sensibility: that it displays suffering as an enjoyable spectacle 
and shows no will to change the conditions that produce it. In ‘The Bird-Catcher and 
his Canary’, the performing bird is killed by a cat while its owner’s attention is 
distracted. The reader is similarly distracted: first from the bird’s fate to the sensibility 
of the bird-catcher as he cries ‘O Bijou! My dearest, only Bijou! Would I were dead 
also!’; then to the tearful musicians who offer him charity, and whose delightful 
sympathy is presented as a ‘banquet’ to the viewer; and then to the even more 
delightful blushes of the modest young lady who tries to hide her own act of charity, 
but reveals her benevolence ‘on every feature of her enchanting face’.45 The sub-
Sternean thrills of Pratt’s writing are not typical of the children’s animal stories, 
which are generally too committed to the cause of rational education to indulge in the 
excesses of sentiment. But the stories do often invoke sympathy for animals as a way 
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of underlining human superiority. Mary Wollstonecraft, for example, does this 
explicitly in Original Stories, where children are advised to be kind to animals as the 
only creatures over whom they have power, and where that kindness will itself 
separate them from the objects of it.
46
 The governess Mrs Mason, having taught her 
charges to be kind to larks, lectures them on man’s superiority to the animals. 
Animals only have involuntary affections and emotions, whereas man is capable of a 
friendship founded on knowledge and virtue. At this, ‘[t]he children eagerly enquired 
in what manner they were to behave, to prove that they were superior to animals? The 
answer was short – be tender-hearted; and let your superior endowments ward off the 
evils which they cannot foresee’.47 Here we have sympathy as pity for an object, the 
feeling for that is now defined within psychology and philosophy in contradistinction 
to empathy, a feeling with another with whom the subject has a strong sense of 
identification.
48
 For all their benevolent actions towards animals, Wollstonecraft’s 
protagonists show little sense of fellowship with them. 
 
 The debate as to whether sympathetic feelings and benevolent actions should 
be seen as selfish or altruistic responses was of course live throughout the eighteenth 
century, with adherents of Hobbes on the one side, and those of Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson on the other. Anxiety about the charge of sympathy’s selfishness appears 
to have led to an inconsistency in Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. Early in the 
text Smith emphasizes that switching places in sympathy with another does not entail 
a dissolution of the self in the other: quite the contrary – we import our own 
knowledge into the other person’s situation and feel as we would feel, not as they feel. 
He gives the example of the loss of reason. We might feel deep commiseration with 
someone who has gone mad, but the sufferer is ‘insensible of his own misery’:  
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The compassion of the spectator must arise from altogether from the 
consideration of what he himself would feel if he was reduced to the same 
unhappy situation, and, what perhaps is impossible, was at the same time able 
to regard it with his present reason and judgement.
49
 
 
 Later in the text, though, where he is answering Hobbes’ arguments about the 
essential selfishness of sympathetic reactions, he insists that sympathy is not a self-
centred act but a movement from the self :  
 
When I sympathise with your sorrow or your indignation it may be pretended 
indeed that my emotion is founded in self-love … yet this imaginary change is 
not supposed to happen in my own person and character, but in that of the 
person with whom I sympathise. When I condole with you for the loss of your 
only son, in order to enter into your grief I do not consider what I, a person of 
such a character and profession, should suffer, if I had a son, and that son were 
unfortunately to die, but I consider what I would suffer if I was really you, and 
I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and 
characters. 
50
 
 
This inconsistency over the extent to which we can enter into the experience of 
another indicates an unsolved question in the discourse of sensibility – a question 
around which novelists of the period organised their narrative experiments.  
 
 In some of the children’s animal narratives there are attempts, sometimes 
sporadic and occasionally sustained, to create reader identification with the experience 
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of animal characters. These attempts can be fruitfully considered not only in the light 
of Smith’s theory, but also in the recent context of Suzanne Keen’s work on the 
relationship between novel-reading and empathy. Keen is sceptical as to the existence 
of the kind of moral and political leverage sometimes attributed to novel-readers’ 
feelings, but her review of the neurological studies of empathy and her researches in 
reader response lend new support to a commonplace of eighteenth-century criticism: 
that sympathetic identification with fictional characters is a strong if not readily 
controllable effect. Particularly interesting in relation to the animal narratives are her 
suggestions that awareness of a narrative’s fictionality encourages empathy because it 
releases readers from the self-protective suspicion they adopt when dealing with 
writing that makes truth-claims; that empathy can be created for characters who differ 
from the reader in all sorts of ways; and that fictional empathy can be created with 
minimal narrative detail and without complex or realistic characterization.
51
  In that 
case the educational writers’ insistence that their rational animals are only fictional 
would have encouraged rather than discouraged children from identifying with them, 
and the animal characters’ species difference and the slightness of their 
characterization need have been no bars to empathy.   
 
 To consider these animal narratives as exercises in the extension of narrative 
empathy across the species divide is to suggest that they anticipate still-live debates 
about the subjective experience of non-human animals. Thomas Nagel’s famous 
question ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ has prompted a variety of answers.52 Nagel’s 
conclusion, that there is some subjective experience attributable to the bat but that we 
have no way of knowing what it is, has roused opposition among writers keener than 
he is on what Adam Smith saw as the imagination’s power to transport us into 
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another’s perspective. Notable here is the novelist J. M. Coetzee, whose Elizabeth 
Costello sets herself against Nagel’s ideas and identifies so strongly with the suffering 
of non-human animals that she is alienated from her human identity.
53
  Jonathan 
Lamb suggests an  eighteenth-century parallel to this in Gulliver’s final self-
identification as a Houhynhm;
54
 but the late eighteenth-century animal narratives do 
not take this radical leap away from humanity. Their attempts at understanding animal 
experience have more in common with the phenomenological method of  Kenneth J. 
Shapiro, who counters Nagel by arguing that we can gain valuable insight into a non-
human animal’s experience by trying to adopt its perspective and observing the details 
of its embodied orientation.
55
 His description of the importance of place in his pet 
dog’s experience can be seen as part of a long tradition of empathetic exploration of 
the world inhabited by companion animals. Keeper’s Travels in Search of his Master  
is its forerunner. Kendall describes his lost and injured dog taking shelter: 
 
His sufferings increased his weariness, and overcome by their acuteness, he 
lay down under a hay-rick, and folded up his legs, curling his body round to 
protect himself from the blast. He would have slept, but the anguish he 
endured, denied him even a short respite from his sorrows. He lay pondering 
his condition: and if he anticipated no evils to come, the same ignorance of 
future events, which men sometimes inconsiderately envy, shut from him the 
hope of deliverance, from those he already experienced. He did not espy death 
in the gloomy rear of his disasters, “making night hideous:” but he thought 
himself confined for ever to his present bleak and unsheltered abode. 
56
 
 
The narrative attends to the details of the dog’s posture to suggest the specificity of a 
dog’s bodily experience, and then moves to analysis of his mental life, revisiting an 
old saw about animals’ freedom from future fears so as to encourage empathy with a 
different way of understanding the world. Kendall’s adoption of a canine perspective 
is limited – throughout the narrative Keeper seems to depend, like humans, very 
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heavily on visual sensations, and there’s no attempt to render his world in smells – but 
it is sufficient to prompt reader empathy. 
 
 The children’s animal narratives, some to a greater and some to a lesser extent, 
shared the project of creating animal experience. They attempted an empathetic 
rendering of life in different kinds of body. To do so, they needed to depict animal 
minds. Alan Palmer suggests that ‘narrative fiction is, in essence, the presentation of 
fictional mental functioning’; that is, even where novels are not directly presenting 
thoughts and feelings they are constructing mental worlds, offering readers the 
pleasure of imaginative access to others’ minds.57 The animal stories employed a 
variety of narrative techniques to create this access. First-person narrative was 
commonly used. The animal autobiography did not always or necessarily offer 
insights into the otherness of non-human experience: often the anthropomorphized 
animal narrator was used to comic effect through his or her expression of all-too-
human foibles.
58
 But it did sometimes ‘invit[e] the reader to experience life from an 
animal’s perspective’.59  The Hare’s breathless, moment-by-moment account of the 
protagonist’s feelings when in danger applies the techniques of contemporary gothic 
narratives to animal experience: 
 
The sounds approached still nearer and nearer, but by slow degrees; my 
agitation was inconceivable: at last they stopped all at once … they seemed to 
be the steps of a man; I listened again; they had totally ceased. I kept my broad 
eyes extended upon each side in fixed attention, eager to receive any 
impression; but the abundance of fern by which I was now surrounded, 
prevented me from observing so accurately as I wished …. presently I heard a 
creeping which approached the spot, a sound as if the breath were drawn with 
difficulty: to my great surprise I discerned the shadow of a man, and was ready 
to sink into the earth with affright, it stopped, and appeared to hold its arm up 
in the attitude of striking with a stick, which was grasped in the hand . . .
60
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The close description of the hare’s position, low on the ground with obscured vision, 
and its characteristic sensory experience – wide angle of vision and acute hearing – 
work towards the creation of a non-human perspective.  
 
 Third-person narrative techniques were also used to create animal minds, most 
notably by Edward Augustus Kendall, who of all the writers discussed here is the 
most interested in exploring animals’ difference of view. In Keeper’s Travels, he 
makes extensive use of thought report, a method that, while inviting the reader to feel 
close to the character’s  inner life, makes use of the narrator’s superior awareness to 
construct a detached perspective on the mind, and to describe mental states of which 
the characters themselves may not be conscious. Thought report allows for an analysis 
of psychic life and a representation of non-verbal mental events.
 61
  The advantage of 
this technique to a sympathetic naturalist like Kendall  is far-reaching: he does not 
need to make his dog speak a human language in order to give it interiority. In one 
episode, he explores Keeper’s sensations when he is trapped in the snow: 
 
His murmurs became fainter, and less incessant. His body grew stiff; and the 
last remaining warmth of life was about to leave him. Even the recollection of 
his master became indistinct and lifeless, as the view before him had been: but 
now his eyes were closed. One look, one short and little look, he wished for; 
and his wildered fancy cheered his expiring moments with the form, and 
features of his master. He fancied that this friend of his life was endeavouring 
to rescue him from his misery. He thought that his warm hand was on his 
neck. He thought that he dug away the perishing snow. The idea became still 
less distinct: he even thought himself relieved from his misery. He fancied 
himself in the arms of his master. He was happy. He was insensible. …62 
 
In fact, Keeper has been rescued by a passing peasant, and, the narrator explains, ‘[i]t 
was this reality that had been distorted, by Keeper’s imagination, into a vision of his 
master’.63 The use of thought report allows Kendall to create reader empathy with 
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Keeper’s suffering and to attribute to him the disordered imagination of delirium, all 
without violating the naturalist’s observation that dogs lack human language. The 
selection of this episode for the frontispiece illustration to the story suggests that it 
was expected to be especially appealing to readers (fig 2). In the passage cited earlier, 
when Keeper is shot and wounded, the narrative mingles a close physical description 
calculated to arouse a physiological sympathy in the reader, with detached comment 
on the difference between dog and human consciousness that emphasizes the need to 
appreciate the kind of mental suffering specific to the non-human animal, whose 
‘ignorance of future events … shut from him the hope of deliverance’.64  In another 
passage, where Keeper has a narrow escape from a herd of aggressive oxen, Kendall 
uses thought report to give a close moment-by-moment account of the dog’s 
sensations. The dramatic immediacy, the references to the dog’s body, and the 
confinement of the perspective, much of the time, to sights and feelings awareness of 
which can be plausibly attributed to a dog, enable a remarkable degree of reader 
identification with the animal protagonist: 
 
He looked about for a by-way, that might enable him to avoid [the oxen]. It 
was in vain: summoning, therefore, all his fortitude, he crept, cowering, 
slouching his ears, and hanging his tail, for they had already left the herbage, 
and menaced his approach. The humility with which he advanced did not 
reconcile his opponents.  
They rushed furiously toward him. They lowered their heads as in the act of 
butting. 
 Keeper was now surrounded. Death seemed inevitable. … In this moment of 
danger, bewildered, and almost terrified to stupefaction; encompassed on 
every side, and on the point of surrendering without hope, and without 
capability of resistance, Keeper, as the last effort, made a desperate sortie: 
 22 
…he leaped on a frozen pool, hoping to cross it, and thus escape his pursuers. 
Unfortunately, the ice was too slight to bear him. He sunk half way into the 
water, and was much hurt by the edges of the ice that surrounded him, in his 
struggles to escape. … he worked his way to another edge of the pool, and 
leaping over a gate, gained an extensive meadow. He had not time to felicitate 
himself on his deliverance, before he perceived other cattle coming towards 
him … Keeper ran: but he presently found himself meeting one who was 
driving furiously at him. …He perceived a gap which led to an adjoining 
field… He made toward this, and creeping through it in a moment, fancied 
himself safe.
65
 
 
We are invited to feel with Keeper. The short sentences ‘Keeper was now surrounded. 
Death seemed inevitable’ verge on free indirect discourse, in that they represent in 
indirect form Keeper’s perceptions, though we need not imagine that he thinks in 
those (or any) words. Thought report lets us believe that a dog might ‘felicitate 
himself on his deliverance’ without human language. At the same time it creates 
ironic distance between narrative and character’s perspective: at the end of this 
passage Keeper ‘fancied himself safe’, but it soon transpires that he is not: he meets 
more cattle.  Kendall’s dog biography, then, uses the narrative techniques being 
developed in this period to create a protagonist whose thoughts and sensations readers 
can both share and regard with a degree of detachment. While I would not claim that 
Kendall is Austen or that Keeper is Emma, this children’s story does contain in 
simplified  form an Austenian amalgamation  of feeling for and ironic awareness of 
the character’s mental processes. Kendall’s application of these techniques to his 
canine protagonist marks a significant moment in the history of animal representation. 
His narrative strategies capture the processes of Smithian sympathy: that close 
bonding of the sympathizer with a consciousness that yet remains clearly other. 
 
The animal narratives of the end of the eighteenth century are pioneers in the 
attempt to represent in fiction what it is like to be another animal. In effect, their 
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readers were invited to occupy in imagination the position of Indur, the hero of one of 
John Aikin’s tales, who undergoes a series of transmigrations allowing him to 
experience life in many forms. Indur lives in country of the ‘Brachmans’, and is 
‘distinguished, not only for that gentleness of disposition and humanity towards all 
living creatures, which are so much cultivated among those people, but for an 
insatiable curiosity respecting the nature and way of life of all animals’.66 In saving a 
monkey from a snake, he is fatally bitten himself; but the monkey turns into the potent 
fairy Perezinda, who allows him a wish concerning his future state of existence: he 
chooses reincarnation, on these terms: ‘In all my transmigrations may I retain a 
rational soul, with the memory of the adventures I have gone through; and when death 
sets me free from one body, may I instantly animate another in the prime of its powers 
and faculties, without passing through the helpless state of infancy’. 67 This 
framework allows for an imaginative engagement with the sensations and viewpoint 
of various animals while accounting for the rational consciousness of the animal 
subject. In Smithian terms Indur has entered imaginatively into his brother’s 
sensations, but retained his ability to ‘regard’ the other’s situation ‘with his present 
reason and judgement’. However, in the detail of his experiences in a series of 
transmigrations, there are some hints of the movement out of one’s ‘own person and 
character’ posited in the later part of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. As an 
antelope, Indur is ‘highly delighted with the ease and rapidity of his motions; and 
snuffing the keen air of the desart, bounded away, scarcely deigning to touch the 
ground with his feet’.68 As a wild goose, ‘With vast delight he sprung forward on easy 
wing through the immense fields of air, and surveyed beneath him extensive tracts of 
earth’, and ‘with great pleasure exercised his various powers, of swimming, diving, 
and flying; sailing round the islands, penetrating into every creek and bay, and visiting 
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the deepest recesses of the woods’.69 As a whale, ‘[w]hen he opened his immense 
jaws, he drew in a flood of brine, which, on rising to the surface, he spouted out again 
in a rushing fountain that rose high in the air with the noise of a mighty cataract. All 
the other inhabitants of the ocean seemed as nothing to him’.70 Late eighteenth-
century animal narratives may have inculcated the duties of human morality, but they 
also offered their readers the pleasures of animal empathy. Shifting between trying to 
imagine animal experience as animal, and offering human analysis of animal minds, 
they brought  the resources of eighteenth-century philosophy and narrative to a 
problem that has been defined in the twenty-first century as ‘the impossible necessity 
of giving voice to the interests of [other] animals’.71 
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